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1. Introduction
On 1 October 2013, a new criminal offence was added to the Dutch Penal Code (DPC). Article 421 DPC 
penalizes the financing of terrorism.1 Combating the financing of terrorism has been agreed upon in 
various international agreements, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism and will also be an important part of the new EU Directive on the prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.2 Article 
421 DPC was introduced after the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental organization 
mandated ‘to set standards and to promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational 
measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation, and 
other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system’, recommended the Dutch 
Government to introduce a separate prohibition of the financing of terrorism, in accordance with 
Recommendation 5 of the FATF’s International standards on combating money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism & proliferation.3 The prohibition of the financing of terrorism is one of several 
crimes that have been introduced into the Dutch criminal justice system in order to comply with both 
international and transnational (European Union) agreements.4
Article 421 DPC prohibits the intentional gathering, acquiring, holding or financing of objects that 
serve to give monetary support to terrorism. As is the case in the legislation of other (Western) countries, 
*	 Dr.	J.M.	ten	Voorde,	Associate	Professor	of	criminal	law	and	criminal	procedure,	Institute	for	Criminal	Law	&	Criminology,	Leiden	University,	
P.O.	Box	9520,	2300	RA	 Leiden	 (the	Netherlands),	 email:	 J.M.ten.Voorde@law.leidenuniv.nl.	 This	 article	 is	 a	 significantly	 revised	and	
extended	version	of	my	article	on	the	same	subject,	published	in	C.P.M.	Cleiren	et	al.	(eds.),	Criteria voor strafbaarstelling in een nieuwe 
dynamiek. Symbolische legitimiteit en maatschappelijke en sociaal-wetenschappelijke realiteit, 2012, pp. 65-85.
1	 Act	of	10	July	2013,	Staatsblad 2013, no. 292.
2	 International	Convention	for	the	Suppression	of	the	Financing	of	Terrorism,	Adopted	by	the	General	Assembly	of	the	United	Nations	in	
Resolution	54/109	of	9	December	1999;	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	the	prevention	of	
the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purpose	of	money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing,	COM(2013)	45.	See	on	the	forms	and	the	
historical	development	of	the	international	measures	against	the	financing	of	terrorism	I.	Bantekas,	‘The	International	Law	of	Terrorist	
Financing’,	2003	The American Journal of International Law 97, pp. 315-333.
3 Kamerstukken II 2012/13,	33	478,	no.	3,	p.	1;	Financial	Action	Task	Force,	International standards on combating money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism & proliferation,	 February	 2012,	 p.	 13;	 Financial	 Action	Task	 Force,	Mutual Evaluation Report. Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. The Netherlands, 2011, p. 66.
4	 See	C.M.	Pelser,	‘Preparations	to	commit	a	crime.	The	Dutch	approach	to	inchoate	offences’,	2008	Utrecht Law Review	4,	no.	3,	p.	57.	
The	prohibition	of	the	financing	of	terrorism	can	also	be	found	in	the	legislations	of	the	United	States	(18	USC	§	2339C),	and	of	various	
European	countries,	including	Austria	(§	278d	Austrian	Penal	Code),	Belgium	(Art.	140	Belgian	Penal	Code),	France	(Art.	421-2-2	French	
Penal	Code),	Germany	(§	89a	German	Penal	Code),	and	Spain	(Art.	576bis	Spanish	Penal	Code).
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a terrorist offence does not have to be committed.5 Nor does there have to be certainty that a terrorist 
offence will be committed in the (near) future. The act that is prohibited counts as a form of preparing the 
causation of harms (which in the context of terrorism can no doubt be very serious harm). Next to this, 
the intentional gathering, etc. of objects that serve to prepare a terrorist offence is also made punishable 
under the new Article 421 DPC. Thus the preparation of the preparation (in German called Vorfeld der 
Vorbereitung) of terrorism is also criminalized.
The prohibition of such behaviour is called Vorverlagerung in German.6 In English, criminal 
offences that do not criminalize the actual causation of harms are called remote harms offences.7 What 
is criminalized is not the act that actually caused harm to others. A person can be held criminally liable 
because he created a danger that harm could be inflicted in the future (by himself or by another person, 
unknown to the person who committed the remote harms offence). Whether or not any harm will 
actually occur (and what harm that will be precisely) is irrelevant for criminal liability in many of the 
recently introduced remote harms offences in Dutch criminal law and the legal systems of various other 
countries, including Germany.8 The criminalization of the financing of terrorism in Dutch legislation and 
the legislation of various other countries, makes this very clear. Both German and English scholars argue 
that the criminal justice system has changed quite dramatically with the increasing number of remote 
harms offences.9
There is little public and political debate about these types of offences. Article 421 DPC was adopted 
by the Dutch Parliament without a thorough plenary debate.10 And, based on a quick search on LexisNexis 
Academic, the bill did not get much media attention. This lack of public and political discussion is not 
a typical Dutch problem. It can be explained, according to Peter Ramsay, because offences that prohibit 
remote harms appeal to our ‘common sense’.11 On the other hand, the prohibition of remote harms 
has caused some serious debate among legal scholars. They do not only warn about the undermining 
of the existing dogmatic structure of the criminal law, they also claim that prohibiting remote harms 
leads to criminal liability too easily and puts the classical foundation of criminal liability (in Anglo-
American legal terms based on actus reus and mens rea) under pressure. These objections require careful 
consideration. The question I will try to provide an answer to in this article is both why and how remote 
harms may be prohibited.12
A lot has been said about criminalizing remote harms among academic scholars in recent years. I  
would like to add my ideas to these discussions, focusing on endangerment, citizenship and control. I 
will take Article 421 DPC as an illustration of why and how remote harms may be criminalized. I will not 
5	 See	for	example	Art.	421-2-2	of	the	French	Penal	Code:	‘Constitue	également	un	acte	de	terrorisme	le	fait	de	financer	une	entreprise	
terroriste	en	fournissant,	en	réunissant	ou	en	gérant	des	fonds,	des	valeurs	ou	des	biens	quelconques	ou	en	donnant	des	conseils	à	cette	
fin,	dans	l’intention	de	voir	ces	fonds,	valeurs	ou	biens	utilisés	ou	en	sachant	qu’ils	sont	destinés	à	être	utilisés,	en	tout	ou	partie,	en	vue	
de	commettre	l’un	quelconque	des	actes	de	terrorisme	prévus	au	présent	chapitre,	indépendamment de la survenance éventuelle d’un 
tel acte.’	(emphasis	added)
6	 L.	Wörner,	‘Expanding	Criminal	Laws	by	Predating	Criminal	Responsibility.	Punishing	Planning	and	Organizing	Terrorist	Attacks	as	a	Means	
to	Optimize	Effectiveness	of	Fighting	Against	Terrorism’,	2012	German Law Journal 13,	pp.	1037-1055.	Sieber	uses	the	term	Vorfeld.	See	
U.	Sieber,	‘Legitimation	und	Grenzen	von	Gefährdungsdelikten	im	Vorfeld	von	terroristischer	Gewalt’,	2009	Neue Zeischrift für Strafrecht 
29,	pp.	353-364.	See	also	D.	Roef,	‘Strafrechtelijke	verantwoordelijkheid	in	de	risicomaatschappij’,	 in	P.L.	Bal	et	al.	(eds.),	Veiligheid of 
vergelding, 2003, p. 39. 
7	 The	term	remote	harms	has	been	used	by,	among	others,	von	Hirsch.	See	A.	von	Hirsch,	‘Extending	the	Harm	Principle:	“Remote”	Harms	
and	Fair	Imputation’,	in	A.P.	Simester	&	A.T.H.	Smith	(eds.),	Harm and Culpability, 1996, pp. 259-276.
8	 We	could	also	refer	to	Art.	134a	DPC	(training	for	terrorism;	Act	of	12	June	2009,	Staatsblad 2009,	no.	245);	and	Art.	248e	DPC	(grooming;	
Act	of	26	November	2009,	Staatsblad 2009,	no.	544).	See	on	grooming	R.	Kool,	‘Prevention	by	All	Means?	A	Legal	Comparison	of	the	
Criminalization	of	Online	Grooming	and	its	Enforcement’,	2011	Utrecht Law Review	7,	no.	3,	pp.	46-69.	See	on	the	prohibition	of	training	
for	terrorism	in	German	criminal	law	(§	129a	German	Penal	Code),	J.	Thielmann,	‘Alles	in	allem	strafbar	oder:	Die	Vorverlagerung	der	
Vorfeldstrafbarkeit’,	2012	Onlinezeitschrift für Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum Strafrecht	13,	pp.	458-465.
9	 See	 e.g.	 B.	 Heinrich,	 ‘Die	 Grenzen	 des	 Strafrechts	 bei	 der	 Gefahrprävention.	 Brauchen	 oder	 haben	 wir	 ein	 “Feindstrafrecht”?’,	
2009 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft	 121,	 pp.	 94-130;	 A.	 Ashworth	 &	 L.	 Zedner,	 ‘Defending	 the	 Criminal	 Law:	
Reflections	on	the	Changing	Character	of	Crime,	Procedure,	and	Sanctions’,	2008	Criminal Law and Philosophy	2,	pp.	40-41.
10 Handelingen II 2012/13,	no.	89,	p.	3;	Handelingen I 2012/13,	no.	35,	p.	22.
11	 P.	Ramsay,	‘Preparation	Offences,	Security	Interests,	Political	Freedom’,	in	R.A.	Duff	et	al.	(eds.),	The structures of the Criminal Law, 2011, 
p.	204.
12	 I	will	 not	 go	 into	 the	 international	 influence	on	present-day	prohibitions	of	 remote	harms	offences.	 See	on	 this	 topic	e.g.	K.	Karsai,	
‘Tendenzen	zur	Vorverlagerung	der	Strafbarkeit	auf	europäischer	und	internationaler	Ebene	–	Europäische	und	internationale	Einflüsse	
auf	die	nationalen	Rechtsordnungen’,	in	A.	Sinn	et	al.	(eds.),	Grenzen der Vorverlagerung in einem Tatstrafrecht. Eine rechtsvergleichende 
Analyse am Beispiel des deutschen und ungarischen Strafrechts,	2011,	pp.	549-571.
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provide an answer to whether or not the financing of terrorism should be prohibited. In Section 2 I will 
focus on the meaning of two central concepts concerning remote harms: harm and danger. Then I will 
introduce the so-called standard harm analysis (Section 3), expanding this analysis in Sections 4 and 5, 
focusing on citizenship and control. With Section 6 I will conclude this article.
2. On harm and the harm principle
2.1. A description of harm
In this article the question of which acts should be criminalized will be answered with the help of the 
concepts of harm and the harm principle, first developed by John Stewart Mill.13
Simester and von Hirsch describe harm as ‘a diminution of the kinds of things that make one’s life go 
well’. When harm is inflicted, the prospects of another person’s life are deteriorated, physically, materially 
and immaterially, while that person had a justified claim that no harm was to be inflicted on him. In 
general, the harm inflicted by a legally responsible person cannot be justified. The harm that was inflicted 
must have changed the life of another person for some while and in some (serious) way.14 Harm can lead 
to victimhood, which means that the personal or physical sources of another person have in some way 
been violated. Personal victimhood, however, is not necessary for the occurrence of harm. Harm can also 
be inflicted when a specific victim cannot be identified immediately, and can be inflicted in an indirect 
way. The idea that life has changed as a result of harm makes a broader interpretation of harm possible, 
because change does not only mean that in order to be able to speak of harm, physical pain must have 
been inflicted. When we talk of inflicting harm in criminal law, we say that a person has unjustifiably 
caused a change in a certain situation, while that person had control over how and in what way that 
change was realized.15 This description leads to the conclusion that thinking cannot be criminalized, for 
someone’s thoughts do not lead to any change in another person’s life.16
From this description it follows that a substantial amount of acts can be criminalized. Critics of the 
use of harm and the harm principle in criminal law refer to this conclusion when they claim that both 
harm and the harm principle should not be used as a foundation of criminalization at all. Because so 
many acts can be seen as harmful acts, what distinguishes harmful from non-harmful acts is unclear. 
According to these critics, harm and the harm principle have lost their distinctive character.17 One could 
respond in two ways to these critical remarks. Firstly, we could strive for a stricter interpretation of harm 
and argue for the prohibition or the criminalization of remote harms.18 In most criminal law systems 
(at least in Western countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), the 
consequence of this response would be the end of many offences and should lead to a reconsideration of 
attempt and preparation as general concepts of substantive criminal law. This, in present-day criminal 
law, is utterly unrealistic and would put the criminal law scholar outside the actual political debate, giving 
him no influence on helping to shape the future of important parts of substantive criminal law. Secondly, 
we could look for more arguments on the basis of which remote harms may legitimately be prohibited. 
This response is, in my opinion, more realistic to look for arguments on the basis of which remote harms 
may be criminalized, in order to find a proper balance in which remote harms offences should or should 
not be criminalized.19
13	 J.S.	Mill,	On liberty, 1975.
14	 A.P.	Simester	&	A.	von	Hirsch,	Crimes, Harms and Wrongs. On the Principles of Criminalization, 2011, p. 36.
15	 Unjustifiable	(or	wrong)	and	control	formed	the	most	important	starting	points	for	criminalization	at	the	time	of	the	introduction	of	the	
Dutch	Penal	Code	in	1881,	and	most	other	penal	codes,	implemented	in	the	nineteenth	century.	For	the	nineteenth	century	legislator	
it	was	quite	certain	what	was	meant	by	an	unjustifiable	act.	This	certainty	has	been	lost.	This	has	led	to	a	scientific	and	political	need	
for	criminalization	criteria.	The	meaning	of	control	has	not	become	clearer	 in	the	 last	decades.	Control	has	become	more	and	more	
equated	with	(political	and/or	social)	obligations.	To	determine	what	amount	of	control	could	be	demanded	from	a	person	is	ex post up 
to	the	courts,	but	ex ante	a	task	for	the	legislator.	Unfortunately	the	meaning	of	control	has	been	neglected	in	the	recent	discussions	on	
criminalization.	This	is	especially	true	when	dealing	with	remote	harms,	where	intent	plays	a	large	role	in	establishing	criminal	liability.	
I	will	turn	to	the	issue	of	control	in	Section	5.
16	 S.	Wallerstein,	‘Criminalising	Remote	Harm	and	the	Case	of	Anti-Democratic	Activity’,	2007	Cardozo Law Review 28, pp. 2700-2701.
17	 See	 e.g.	 the	much-cited	 article	 by	 Bernard	 E.	 Harcourt,	 ‘The	 Collapse	 of	 the	 Harm	 Principle’,	 1999	 The Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology	90,	pp.	109-194.
18	 See	for	a	further	elaboration	on	this	‘purist’	approach,	Ashworth	&	Zedner,	supra	note	9,	pp.	44-45.
19	 D.	Husak,	‘The	Criminal	Law	as	Last	Resort’,	2004	Oxford Journal of Legal Studies	24,	pp.	215,	225.	See	also	H.	Landau,	‘Die	deutsche	
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2.2. Danger of harm 
A question is whether the criminal law should only respond to harms which have already occurred or 
whether it may also be used to prevent future harms. It comes as no surprise that criminal law can also 
respond when there is a danger of harm, in order to prevent harm from occurring.20 In this article, I will 
use the term remote harms offences for offences that prohibit a danger of harm. Of the various forms of 
remote harms offences, in this article only endangerment offences will be discussed, that is offences that 
prohibit the creation of the danger of harm. For the purpose of this article, remote harms offences and 
endangerment offences will be used as synonyms.
What does the danger of harm mean?21 A danger of harm can be described as a condition in which 
the chance that harm will occur is unacceptably high.22 This means, first of all, that there must be a 
certain chance that an unjustifiable harm will occur. What harm will occur does not have to be explicated 
under the terms of a certain offence. When harm is explicitly mentioned in the offence, that offence 
is called a concrete endangerment offence. Offences in which harm is mentioned only in vague terms 
can be called abstract-concrete endangerment offences.23 Offences in which harm is not mentioned 
explicitly can be called abstract endangerment offences. All three types of endangerment offences have 
long since been accepted.24 However, it is clear that many offences that were introduced in the past few 
decades are described as abstract or abstract-concrete endangerment offences. Article 421 DPC is an 
example of an abstract-concrete endangerment offence, because the offences mentioned in Paragraph 2 
of this Article refer to various types of (less or more serious versions of) harm, but do not make one 
specific type of harm explicit. Both abstract-concrete and abstract endangerment offences are in need 
for clear justification, because the reference to harm is vague. As will be discussed below, the level of the 
justification of abstract-concrete endangerment offences and abstract endangerment offences is in the 
end quite the same.
2.3. An objective or subjective view of endangerment
The debate on endangerment offences focuses mainly on the meaning of the word chance. I stated that 
in Dutch legal doctrine, the chance of harm in case of concrete endangerment offences is described as 
being unacceptably high. What does that mean? Some authors believe that the interpretation of the 
meaning of chance, and endangerment in general, has radicalized in the past few decades.25 By this 
they mean that what was not seen as a chance of danger previously, is qualified as such now. On the 
one hand, looking at the development of endangerment offences (including the century-old debate on 
Strafrechtsdogmatik	 zwischen	 Anpassung	 und	 Selbstbehauptung	 –	 Grenzkontrolle	 der	 Kriminalpolitik	 durch	 die	 Dogmatik?’,	
2009 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechts-wissenschaft	121,	pp.	965-967.	Landau	urges	legal	scholars	to	develop	a	theory	on	how	to	
deal	with	remote	harms	offences. See	more	critical	H.	Stewart,	‘The	Limits	of	the	Harm	Principle’,	2010	Criminal Law and Philosophy	4,	
pp.	17-35,	and,	Ashworth	&	Zedner,	supra	note	9,	pp.	46-48.
20	 J.	Feinberg,	The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Harm to Others, Volume	1,	1984,	pp.	190-193.
21	 I	have	chosen	not	to	use	the	term	risk	in	this	article,	because,	contrary	to	endangerment,	risk	is	not	a	term	familiar	to	legal	doctrine	in	
various	legal	systems	on	the	European	continent.	The	term	risk	is	associated	with	important	sociological	and	criminological	perspectives	
on	the	development	of	the	welfare	state	society	into	a	so-called	risk	society	or	preventative	state.	The	development	towards	a	risk	society	
has	highly	influenced	the	criminal	justice	system	(D.	Garland,	The Culture of Control,	2001; B.	Hudson,	Justice in the Risk Society,	2003).	
It	is	argued	that	the	risk	society	has	led	to	a	criminal	justice	system	in	which	great	faith	is	put	into	the	prohibition	of	more	and	more	
endangerment	offences.	These	offences	are	as	such	not	invented	by	the	risk	society.	However,	the	introduction	of	more	endangerment	
offences,	especially	abstract	endangerment	offences,	forms	an	important	expression	of	the	way	the	criminal	justice	system	is	interpreted	
and	used	in	the	risk	society.	In	this	view	the	term	risk	has	not	become	a	part	of	substantive	criminal	law	doctrine;	it	is	the	endangerment	
offences	that	have	been	used	to	reshape	the	criminal	justice	system	towards	a	more	risk-oriented	criminal	justice	system.
22	 I	have	based	this	description	on	E.F.	Stamhuis,	Gemeen gevaar,	2006,	p.	5.	In	the	following,	I	sometimes	refer	to	Dutch	literature,	because	
the	ideas	posed	in	the	sources	which	I	refer	to	have	helped	me	to	form	my	own	opinion	on	issues	discussed	in	this	article.	I	will	also	refer	
to	Dutch	case	law,	as	giving	examples	helps	to	make	my	position	clearer.
23	 K.	Hoffmann-Holland,	Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 2011, p. 23.
24	 The	 term	abstract	endangerment	 is	 the	 common	 term	 in	both	Dutch	and	German	criminal	 legal	doctrine.	 The	 term	 is	 also	used	by	
Simester	&	von	Hirsch	(supra	note	14,	pp.	57-58).	Duff	and	Husak,	however,	use	the	term	implicit	endangerment.	The	endangerment	is	
implicit	because	the	relevant	danger	is	not	specified	in	the	offence.	The	harm	that	could	be	inflicted	is	only	mentioned	implicitly,	which	
means	 in	more	general	 rather	 than	 specific	 terms.	 Implicit	 and	abstract	 are	not	quite	 the	 same:	an	abstract	endangerment	offence	
can	still	be	an	explicit	endangerment	offence	because	the	danger	is	described	in	the	offence,	however	abstract.	I	will	not	go	into	this	
any	further.	 It	shows	the	differences	between	common	law	and	civil	 law	legal	doctrine,	which	one	has	to	be	aware	of.	See	R.A.	Duff,	
‘Criminalizing	Endangerment’,	2005	Louisiana Law Review	65,	pp.	959-963;	D.	Husak,	Overcriminalization. The Limits of the Criminal Law, 
2008, pp. 162-163.
25 R. Pieterman, De voorzorgcultuur. Streven naar veiligheid in een wereld vol risico en onzekerheid,	2008,	pp.	43-81.
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attempt),26 the presumption that there has been a radicalization of what constitutes a chance of danger 
is questionable, because far-reaching interpretations of what constitutes a danger of harm have always 
existed. On the other hand, if we look at several criminal offences that have been introduced over the 
past decade, we cannot but endorse the claim that the criminal liability described in those offences is in 
some cases extremely broad. This is the case with concrete endangerment offences (the sooner a certain 
act is considered as dangerous, the sooner a person can be held criminally liable), but also in the case of 
abstract(-concrete) endangerment offences. What seems to be the case is that the connection between 
danger and harm has become more loosened. It seems that it is no longer necessary to describe an act as 
dangerous because of the harm that can be inflicted. An act can be dangerous in itself. A connection with 
harm is not necessary. This is not a new phenomenon. What is new is that legislators take these offences 
very seriously. This already becomes clear if we look at the maximum sentences imposed for several 
recently introduced abstract(-concrete) endangerment offences, for example the financing of terrorism.27
Taking Article 421 DPC as an example, what is penalized here is the act of donating money or other 
objects with a certain monetary value. This is something many people regularly do and in itself is quite 
innocent. One could say that prohibiting this kind of behaviour is unacceptable, because a government 
has no real interest in how people spend their money.28 However, what is prohibited under Article 421 
DPC is not the mere donation of money, but the fact that the purpose of the money is (for others) 
to commit terrorist offences.29 The prohibition of donating money for this purpose concerns more of a 
governmental interest, because it is unquestionable that the serious harm that can be inflicted by terrorist 
offences is the concern of governments.30 But even then the question is whether the person who donates 
money should be held criminally liable. From an endangerment perspective, the question is whether 
there is a certain chance that the money that was donated will be used to commit terrorist offences. The 
path from donating money to the actual terrorist offence can be very long, involving several people, 
other than the donator.31 There remains quite an amount of uncertainty whether the money will be 
used for terrorist offences and therewith actually lead to harm. This leads to the conclusion that the 
justification of the prohibition of the financing of terrorism is based mainly on the dangerousness of the 
act of financing. The connection with the harm that could be inflicted is so loose that this harm cannot 
be the sole justification of the prohibition of financing of terrorism.
However, being so loose does not mean that no connection can be made between the dangerous act 
and the harm that could be inflicted. There are different views on whether there is a danger of harm. We 
can distinguish two: an objective and a subjective view.32 
From an objective view on endangerment, there can only be a danger of harm when there is a certain 
probability (let us call it a considerable chance) that the act will result in harm. Whether an act is seen 
as constituting a (sufficient) danger of harm depends on the act, not on the intent of the actor. The more 
certainty there is about what will cause harm, the sooner it is accepted that this act is dangerous. This also 
means that the more (scientific) knowledge is gained on the dangers of certain acts, the sooner an act is 
objectively qualified as dangerous and could be prohibited.33 
26	 H.	Kemshall,	Understanding risk in criminal justice,	2003,	pp.	8-14.
27	 See	e.g.	Art.	421	DPC	(a	maximum	of	eight	years	imprisonment	and	a	fine	of	up	to	€	810	000),	§	89a	German	Penal	Code	(six	months	to	ten	
years	imprisonment);	Art.	140	Belgian	Penal	Code	(five	to	ten	years	imprisonment	and	a	fine	of	up	to	€	5000	(with	a	minimum	of	€	100)).
28	 Husak,	supra	note	24,	pp.	159-160,	162	et	seq.
29	 See	e.g.	also	Art.	140	of	the	Belgian	Penal	Code	which	prohibits	the	financing	of	an	activity	of	a	terrorist	group,	while	the	donor	knows	
that	his	financial	donation	will	contribute	to	terrorist	offences.
30	 See	e.g.	Council	Framework	Decision	2008/919/JHA	of	28	November	2008,	amending	Framework	Decision	2002/475/JHA	on	combating	
terrorism,	OJ	L	330,	9.12.2008,	p.	21.
31	 Compare	 N.	 Crimm,	 ‘High	 Alert:	 The	 Government’s	War	 on	 the	 Financing	 of	 Terrorism	 and	 Its	 Implications	 for	 Donors,	 Charitable	
Organizations	and	Global	Philanthropy’,	2004	William and Mary Law Review	45,	pp.	1341-1451.
32	 See	V.	Haas,	‘Zum	Rechtsgrund	von	Versuch	und	Rücktritt’,	2011	Zeitschrift für die gesamte Straf-rechtswissenschaft	123,	pp.	227-231.	See	
also	J.	Remmelink,	mr. D. Hazewinkel-Suringa’s Inleiding tot de studie van het Nederlandse Strafrecht, 1975, pp. 60-62.
33	 The	radicalization	of	endangerment,	as	described	by	Pieterman	(supra	note	25),	has	much	to	do	with	our	increased	knowledge	about	
whether	a	certain	act	will	lead	to	harm.	The	fact	that	nowadays	more	acts	are	considered	dangerous	is	in	my	opinion	not	caused	by	a	
different	view	on	danger,	but	first	of	all	by	our	increased	knowledge	about	what	could	lead	to	harm.	This	increased	knowledge	can	be	
used	in	case	law,	because	courts	are	allowed	to	use	expert	witnesses.	The	more	experts	know	about	the	chances	that	certain	acts	will	
lead	to	harm,	the	more	courts	could	consider	certain	acts	as	being	dangerous.	The	criminalization	of	acts	that	are,	according	to	experts,	
objectively	dangerous,	will	probably	not	be	considered	a	problem.	However,	when	what	counts	as	danger	is	based	on	vague	ideas	on	how	
dangerous	a	certain	act	might	be,	this	will	not,	from	an	objective	view	on	endangerment,	make	the	case	for	the	criminalization	of	that	
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From a subjective view on endangerment, an act may be described as dangerous because of the 
intent of the actor. If it was the actor’s intent to create harm, even without the act being objectively 
dangerous (the act does not create a considerable chance of constituting a harm), the act could still be 
considered dangerous. From this point of view, uncertainty as to whether an act constitutes a (sufficient) 
danger of harm is irrelevant for qualifying an act as dangerous, subject to the condition that the intent of 
the actor to cause harm is clear. Therefore, from a subjective view, no objective connection between the 
act and harm does not mean that this act cannot be considered dangerous.
2.4. The end of an objective view of endangerment?
Can acts become criminal solely because they have been committed with criminal intent? To answer this 
question, we could look at case law, for example the Dutch case against Samir A.34 A. was prosecuted 
for, among other acts, the preparation of murder. In his apartment, the police found instructions on 
the use of firearms, batteries, Christmas tree lighting, an electric wire, fertilizer, various chemicals, 
a bulletproof vest, maps of various governmental and other buildings, etc. Primarily based on taped 
telephone conversations by A. with other persons, it was clear that A. wanted to attack various buildings 
(including the Dutch Parliament building, a nuclear power plant and Schiphol Airport). According to the 
Dutch Supreme Court, the objects that were found at A.’s apartment could, in their outward appearance, 
be considered instrumental for the defendant’s criminal intent. The fact that the objects themselves 
were quite harmless35 was not problematical because of the fact that the defendant had the intention 
to use them to commit terrorist attacks. Thus, objectively harmless objects can become subjectively 
dangerous.36 Criminalizing these kinds of preparatory acts is only possible if the defendant’s intent 
becomes more important than the acts – that at the time of their discovery objectively could not be 
considered dangerous – committed.
A more subjective view on endangerment has been observed in literature as well and seems to have 
become more and more important. Ramsay explains this by referring to a changed attitude concerning 
issues of security.37 From an objective point of view, it is important to connect the act to harm. There 
must be, using Dutch terminology, a considerable chance that the act leads to a certain harm. The more 
considerable that chance, the more acceptable the criminalization of that act. From a certain interpretation 
of a subjective view on endangerment, a connection between the act and harm is considered less 
important. The central issue becomes whether the defendant intended to cause harm. Such an intent 
leads to an increased feeling of insecurity among other citizens and the need for action. Criminalization 
is then justified on the basis of the subjective fear of harm, whilst objectively, the criminalized act need 
not be considered dangerous, but only becomes so because of the criminal intent of the defendant. What 
is emphasised is not an objective danger of harm (actus reus), but the criminal intent to create harm 
(mens rea).
Article 421 DPC forms an example of this shift to mens rea. Whether there is a considerable chance 
that a terrorist attack will be committed after the act of donating money is irrelevant for criminal liability. 
If someone donates money to another person and the former thinks that the latter has an intent to 
commit terrorist crimes, the donor can still be held criminally liable under Article 421 DPC, even if his 
thoughts prove to have been false.
act	very	strong.	The	fact	that	Art.	421	DPC	is	based	on	rather	vague	ideas	(Kamerstukken II 2012/13,	33	478,	no.	6,	p.	4)	contradicts	the	
long-standing	ideas	on	endangerment,	and	can	be	seen	as	proof	that	the	ideas	about	endangerment	offences	are	changing.
34	 Hoge	Raad	(Dutch	Supreme	Court)	20	February	2007,	LJN	AZ0213.
35	 The	Court	of	Appeal,	that	acquitted	A.,	decided	that	while	there	was	no	doubt	about	A.’s	intent,	the	preparatory	acts	were	still	at	such	an	
early	stage	and	so	inert	and	primitive	that	there	was	no	real	threat	of	any	harm.	See	Court	of	Appeal	of	The	Hague,	18	November	2005,	
LJN AU6181.
36	 A.’s	criminal	 intent	was	not	 the	only	argument	on	the	basis	of	which	A.	was	convicted	of	committing	preparatory	acts.	His	acts	 (the	
gathering	of	a	variety	of	materials)	were	also	taken	into	account,	in	combination	with	the	defendant’s	intent.	Without	proof	of	his	intent,	
however,	the	conviction	of	Samir	A.	would	have	been	far	more	difficult.
37	 Ramsay,	supra	note	11,	pp.	209-214.
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3. The standard harm analysis
To understand why and how an act is only subjectively dangerous, we have to take several steps, starting 
by answering the question why harmful acts can be prohibited. This question can be answered with the 
help of the so-called standard harm analysis. This consists of three steps, namely: the seriousness of 
harm, the social value of the harm-causing act and the side-effects of criminalization.38 The greater the 
harm, that is to say, the greater the prospect that someone’s life will be (negatively) changed in a physical, 
material and/or immaterial way, the sooner the prohibition of the harm-causing act will be legitimate. 
The more valuable the harm-causing act, and the more problematic the side-effects of criminalization, 
the less acceptable criminalization will be. What counts as valuable depends of what counts as good 
or as bad. What is considered good or bad depends on a certain context, and is, in our multicultural 
society, very difficult to describe. Arranging a marriage is considered normal by various ethnic groups 
(and was considered normal in the higher social classes up to the first half of the twentieth century), 
but is nowadays considered a serious problem in many Western countries.39 That means, first of all, that 
a government must take seriously the democratic debate within and outside Parliament to understand 
which actions are considered valuable and to translate the outcome of this debate into a well-described 
criminal offence.
Up to a point, the standard harm analysis can be used in case of endangerment offences. The first 
step of the standard harm analysis can be extended to concrete endangerment offences.40 The more 
considerable the chance of an objective danger of harm, the more acceptable prohibiting this act will 
be. The less considerable the chance of a danger of harm, the less acceptable will be the criminalization 
of such an act.41 The legislator has to be aware of the risk of criminalizing innocent acts. That would 
contradict the starting point that only unjustified acts (based on democratically established agreement) 
should be criminalized.42 The legislator should maintain a certain distance between the criminal law and 
other areas of the law (such as administrative law).43
The second step of the standard harm analysis can be expanded not only by accepting the 
criminalization of acts that cause harm, but also acts that create a certain danger of harm.44 The more 
valuable the dangerous act, the less reasons to criminalize this act. This would seem contradictory: the 
fact that the act is dangerous would be enough reason to criminalize the act. But consider this example. 
The parent who teaches his child to swim with clothes on in the part of the swimming pool where the 
child cannot reach the bottom of the pool creates a danger for that child (there is a possibility the child 
will drown). But we agree that the act is justified and can even be recommended, because the child learns 
how to handle him/herself if he or she should ever fall into water. This does not mean that throwing a 
38	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	55.
39	 Arranged	or	forced	marriages	are	even	considered	a	crime	against	humanity	by	the	Special	Court	for	Sierra	Leone.	See	N.	Jain,	‘Forced	
Marriage	 as	 a	 Crime	 against	 Humanity.	 Problems	 of	 Definition	 and	 Prosecution’,	 2008	 Journal of International Criminal Justice 6, 
pp. 1013-1032.
40	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	pp.	55	et	seq.
41	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 abstract(-concrete)	 endangerment	 offences	 are	 unacceptable.	However,	 the	 standard	 harm	 analysis	 is	 not	
enough	to	justify	the	prohibition	of	such	offences.
42	 Duff,	supra	note	24,	pp.	952-953.
43	 That	does	not	mean	that	the	same	issue	cannot	be	dealt	with	in	criminal	law,	civil	law	and	administrative	law.	What	is	meant	here	is	that	
the	legislator	should	distinguish	different	‘tracks’	(criminal,	civil	and	administrative)	in	dealing	with	the	same	issues,	avoiding	that	these	
tracks	lead	to	three	different	types	of	sanctioning	(the	so-called	notion	of	una via).	The	legislator	should	therefore	pay	careful	attention	
to	 the	various	alternative	enforcement	 tracks	and,	especially	when	other	enforcement	 tracks	already	exist,	explain	why	a	new	track	
(i.e.	criminal	law	enforcement)	is	necessary	next	to	the	existing	tracks	(see	P.	Minkkinen,	‘“If	Taken	in	Earnest”:	Criminal	Law	Doctrine	
and	the	Last	Resort’,	2006	The Howard Journal	45,	pp.	532-533).	In	the	case	of	remote	harms	this	is	particularly	necessary,	because	it	
has	become	quite	common	to	use	more	than	one	enforcement	track	to	fight	remote	harms.	In	the	case	of	Art.	421	DPC	the	legislator	
recognized	 the	existence	of	more	enforcement	 tracks,	 and	 tried	 to	 explain	 the	necessity	of	 the	prohibition	of	 this	 offence,	 but	 this	
explanation	is	really	nothing	more	than	a	concatenation	of	generalities.	See	Kamerstukken II 2012/13,	33	478,	no.	6,	pp.	8-9.
44	 Simester	 and	 von	 Hirsch	 point	 out	 that	 the	 standard	 harms	 analysis	 can	well	 be	 used	 to	 legitimize	 the	 criminalization	 of	 concrete	
endangerment	offences	(supra	note	14,	p.	76).	It	becomes	more	difficult	to	decide	whether	certain	behaviour	should	be	criminalized	
using	 concrete	 endangerment	 offences	 or	 using	 abstract	 endangerment	 offences.	 That	 choice	 depends	 on	 a	 balance	 between	 the	
interests	of	the	offender	versus	the	interests	of	others	(the	victim	but	also	other	citizens).	According	to	Simester	and	von	Hirsch	this	
decision	could	also	be	based	on	the	standard	harm	analysis	(pp.	77-79).	I	would	think	that	this	depends	on	how	remote	the	eventual	harm	
is.	The	more	remote	the	eventual	harm	and	the	more	dependent	the	prohibition	of	the	offence	on	the	intent	of	the	offender,	the	less	the	
standard	harm	analysis	can	be	used.	In	that	case	the	legislator	has	to	use	other	arguments	on	which	to	base	the	prohibition	of	abstract	
endangerment	offences.
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child with his cloths on into the water can never be prohibited. Doing this with the purpose of killing 
the child can of course never be allowed. This example makes clear that the legislator should point out 
as accurately as possible which acts should and which acts should not be criminalized.45 Especially in 
the case of endangerment offences, a careful editing of such a criminal offence is necessary. On the one 
hand, the legislator must avoid criminal offences becoming over-inclusive (an offence is formulated too 
broadly)46 and, on the other hand, becoming under-inclusive (an offence is described in such a way that 
it leads to unjustified discrimination among the addressees of the offence).47
The third step of the standard harm analysis is even more important in case of endangerment 
offences as it is in the case of offences that cause harm.48 The further we get from harm, the greater the 
side-effects, and the less the standard harm analysis can be used to decide whether certain acts should 
be criminalized.49 For instance, if the harm that could be inflicted is so severe, could that be a sufficient 
reason for prohibiting an act, even if this prohibition leads to a great loss of liberty? The standard harm 
analysis does not provide an answer to this question. According to Simester and von Hirsch, in the 
analysis liberty is treated ‘merely as a weighing factor’, not the starting point from which the question 
whether or not to prohibit a certain act should begin.50 I will return to this point in the next section. 
Second, the standard harm analysis does not provide a framework for dealing with offences that put 
great emphasis on mens rea, like present-day abstract endangerment offences. I will deal with this point 
in Section 5.
4. Extending the standard harm analysis to cases of remote harms
4.1. The de minimis principle
On the basis of the de minimis principle, the criminalization of endangerment offences is allowed, but 
only when the harm that could be inflicted by a dangerous act itself is serious enough to be criminalized, 
and the offence is ‘no more extensive than to achieve its purpose.’51 In light of this, the legislator should 
not only be required to provide arguments as to why a certain dangerous act should be criminalized, 
but also why the harm that could be inflicted by the dangerous act is in itself serious enough (or, so to 
speak, sufficiently unjustified) to be criminalized. The legislator must also show that the offence does 
help to achieve its purpose, for example by preventing offences which do cause harm to occur.52 The 
45	 Wörner,	supra	note	6,	p.	1046.	In	the	case	of	remote	harms	offences,	a	legislator	should	take	much	more	time	to	explain	why	it	wants	to	
prohibit	remote	harms,	and	how	it	has	criminalized	this	behaviour.	A	certain	vagueness	surrounding	an	offence	is	allowed,	as	long	as	what	
is	prohibited	is	still	in	accordance	with	the	demands	of	accessibility	and	foreseeability.	However,	remote	harms	offences,	being	vague	by	
nature,	do	not	absolve	the	legislator	from	trying	to	explain,	in	the	text	of	the	offence	or	in	the	explanatory	memorandum,	what	acts	are	
prohibited,	and	how	the	various	elements	of	an	offence	should	be	interpreted.	This	does	not	only	mean	the	explanation	of	mens rea,	but	
also	the	explanation	of	the	act,	considering	in	more	detail	what	types	of	actions	are	criminalized	and	why.	This	is	of	course	not	possible	in	
detail,	but	a	more	detailed	description	can	sometimes	be	necessary.	That	does	not	only	protect	citizens	against	too	great	an	involvement	in	
their	lives,	but	could	also	help	the	police	and	prosecution	service	to	understand	what	actions	to	investigate	and	to	prosecute.	The	less	clear	
a	certain	offence	is,	the	more	difficulties	the	police	and	public	prosecution	service	experience	in	deciding	when	to	use	scarce	investigative	
resources.	This	last	point	shows	that	the	question	of	what	remote	harms	should	be	prohibited,	and	how,	is	not	just	a	matter	of	substantive	
criminal	law,	it	is	also	a	matter	of	procedural	law,	for	when	to	investigate	what	also	depends	on	how	clear	an	offence	is	written	down.	
46	 Over-inclusively	described	criminal	offences	cannot	have	a	preventive	effect,	nor	could	be	consonant	with	the	retributive	goal	of	the	
criminal	law.	The	more	vaguely	a	criminal	offence	is	described,	the	less	deterrent	it	will	be.	The	more	vague	a	reference	to	harm,	the	
less	retributive	a	punishment	for	committing	this	offence	will	be.	See	Duff,	supra	note	24,	pp.	958-959.	In	the	case	of	Art.	421	DPC,	the	
legislator	seems	to	have	taken	notice	of	his	point.	The	acts,	described	in	Art.	421	DPC,	seem	to	be	more	closely	linked	with	the	eventual	
harm	that	can	be	caused.	See	Kamerstukken II 2012/13,	33	478,	no.	3,	pp.	5-7.
47	 Husak,	supra	note	24,	pp.	211-212.
48	 Wallerstein,	 supra	note	16,	p.	2714.	See	also	A.	Ashworth	&	L.	Zedner,	 ‘Just	Prevention:	Preventive	Rationales	and	 the	Limits	of	 the	
Criminal	Law’,	in	R.A.	Duff	&	S.P.	Green	(eds.),	Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, 2011, pp. 290, 292.
49	 Wallerstein,	supra	note	16,	p.	2715;	Ashworth	&	Zedner,	supra	note	48,	p.	286;	W.	Wilson,	Central Issues in Criminal Theory, 2002, p. 31.
50	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	56.	
51	 Husak,	supra	note	24,	p.	160.
52	 Husak,	supra	note	24,	p.	162.	Surely,	this	is	not	the	only	purpose	of	introducing	a	criminal	offence.	In	the	case	of	Art.	421	DPC,	one	of	the	
purposes	of	criminalization	is	to	show	other	states	and	international	organizations	the	Dutch	commitment	to	combat	the	financing	of	
terrorism,	and	second	making	it	clear	to	the	police	and	public	prosecution	service	that	more	investigation	and	prosecution	is	needed.	As	
long	as	other	motivations	for	criminalization	are	based	on,	for	example,	the	standard	harm	analysis	(and	are	in	line	with	the	de minimis 
principle),	I	cannot	say	that	these	motivations	are	unacceptable.	We	also	have	to	realize	that	the	question	whether	criminalization	will	be	
effective	(preventing	people	from	committing	crime),	cannot	be	answered	with	a	firm	yes	or	no.	See	J.L.	van	der	Leun,	‘Strafbaarstelling	
en evidence	 vanuit	 criminologisch	perspectief’,	 in	 C.P.M.	Cleiren	et	 al.	 (eds),	Criteria voor strafbaarstelling in een nieuwe dynamiek. 
Symbolische legitimiteit versus maatschappelijke en sociaalwetenschappelijke realiteit, 2012, pp. 25-37.
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de minimis principle allows the prohibition of remote harms, as long as the harm that could be caused 
is unjustified from a criminal law perspective.53 That being the case, the de minimis principle does not 
demand that a considerable chance of causing a harm is necessary for prohibiting certain acts. From a 
preventive point of view, it could very well be necessary to criminalize acts which themselves do not 
cause (or create a considerable chance of) harm. However, it is not immediately clear what should or 
should not be criminalized from a preventive point of view.54 The de minimis principle does not make a 
distinction between concrete and abstract(-concrete) endangerment offences and therefore misses the 
important point that the prohibition of abstract(-concrete) endangerment offences leads to criminalizing 
acts which are in themselves not always unjustified. This means that the legislator should pay careful 
attention to what is criminalized and whether this offence will achieve its purpose. It must, for example, 
be clear why the possession of a balaclava and tools for breaking and entering is not a preparatory act 
under the Dutch Penal Code, whilst the possession of a balaclava and tools for breaking and entering by 
two or more persons does constitute a criminal act. One explanation could be that in the second example 
more persons are involved in the act that could cause harm. Does that mean that the de minimis principle 
could be nuanced when two or more persons are involved in committing the dangerous act?
Whether criminalization is justified is less problematic in the second example, because in that case 
there is a certain co-operation between two or more persons who have (also) agreed to commit crimes. 
Even in the event that these crimes have not yet been committed, the co-operation itself is dangerous 
enough and forms a legitimate argument to criminalize the aforementioned behaviour.55 But, if such a 
co-operation is not present, is very loose, or not clear at all, as is the case with the financing of terrorism, 
is the act of donating money enough for prohibition? Why should we prohibit A’s act of donating money 
whilst we do not know whether the money is going to be used by B to commit terrorist crimes, nor even 
know whether B is going to commit terrorist crimes in the near or distant future? Could prohibiting 
A’s act solely be based on the argument that this would help to prevent others from committing similar 
acts? That would fail to appreciate that only a legally autonomous person can be held criminally liable for 
committing an unjustified act. One cannot be held criminally liable solely on the basis of being part of a 
group of persons, unless that person performs, for example, a significant and essential contribution to the 
offence.56 At the same time, a more limited view on prevention, for example stating that only the last act 
before the harm was inflicted should be criminalized (the last effective point of intervention),57 does not 
help us any further, because it does not help us to limit present-day criminal offences that criminalize acts 
that lay far before the last effective point of intervention. To conclude, the de minimis principle does not 
help us to find a clear justification of why abstract(-concrete) endangerment offences can be prohibited.
4.2. ‘Fair imputation’
The above shows that the criminalization of remote harms cannot solely be based on preventative theory. 
Criminal liability should be based on individual responsibility for acts that the individual offender has 
committed. In order to prevent criminal liability from being based on arguments other than individual 
responsibility, we need to consider how to express an individual’s liability in a criminal offence for acts 
that do not cause harm. The principle of ‘fair imputation’, first developed by von Hirsch,58 could be useful 
in answering this question. The principle of fair imputation deals with the following questions: ‘how, and 
why, can the supposed eventual harm fairly be imputed to the actor?’59 The term imputation means more 
than mere intent or negligence. Even if the act was committed intentionally (or with negligence), the 
legislator needs to ask whether and why the act should be fairly imputed on the actor. Simester and von 
Hirsch argue that the principle of fair imputation is a matter of obligations. They distinguish social from 
political obligations. Social obligations are to be found on the level of a certain act and refer to the context 
53	 Ashworth	&	Zedner,	supra	note	48,	p.	291.
54	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	76;	Ashworth	&	Zedner,	supra	note	48,	pp.	280-282.
55	 In	my	opinion,	committing	a	crime	with	another	person	makes	the	criminal	act	at	least	twice	as	dangerous	compared	to	the	case	where	
the	crime	was	committed	by	one	person.
56	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	81.
57	 Wallerstein,	supra	note	16.
58	 Von	Hirsch,	supra	note	7.
59	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	63;	Von	Hirsch,	supra	note	7,	p.	269.
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within which the act took place. Political obligations can be found on the level of society and refer to 
duties of citizenship. Simester and von Hirsch have not developed these obligations much further, but 
seem to recognize that they can be useful in discussing the limits of criminalizing remote harms.60
4.3. Obligations
4.3.1. Social obligations
Social obligations are related to the act itself and the context within which the act was committed. They 
help to make clear how a person should act within a certain situation in the social or economic sphere. 
The content of social obligations can be found in written texts (protocols, guidelines or legislation), but 
can also take the form of unwritten obligations (principles of carefulness) and are directed at a person 
who acts in a certain capacity, such as a civil servant or employee (we could call these types of social 
obligations functional obligations), or someone who lacks that formal capacity, but who is held to certain 
social obligations because of the specific context within which he acts (e.g., any person who sells goods via 
the internet, whether as a professional or not, must act in accordance with certain social obligations). By 
explicitly referring in the text of a criminal offence to a certain position in society, the legislator can make 
these social obligations become part of the criminal offence and therewith clarify what is criminalized 
and to whom the criminalization is directed.61 A stricter description of the offender’s social obligations 
in the criminal offence can (further) limit the scope of that offence. Limiting the scope is also possible by 
clarifying principles of carefulness through regulation via (international) protocols, guidelines, etc., that 
could be mentioned in the legislator’s explanatory memorandum.
We have to be aware that clarifying the meaning of the principles of carefulness can not only limit 
the scope of the criminal offence, but can also extend that scope. The more complex social obligations 
become (for instance in private regulations), and the more persons are subjected to certain social 
obligations, the broader the scope of a criminal offence can become.62 This leads to the conclusion that 
fair imputation with the help of social obligations is possible, but it does not necessarily mean that social 
obligations always lead to fair imputation.
4.3.2. Political obligations
To understand political obligations properly we need to clarify the concept of citizenship in criminal 
law.63 In this section two visions on citizenship are discussed: a liberal and a republican one. Other 
visions are left aside for the purposes of brevity.64 The use of the concept of citizenship in this article 
makes clear that the criminal justice system is based on the idea that it deals with citizens, and makes no 
difference among those who abide and those who do not abide by the law, nor that criminal law makes a 
difference between normal and abnormal criminal offences, that is offences that are hostile to the polity. 
This means that Feindstrafrecht or enemy criminal law as a foundation of some parts of the criminal law 
is unacceptable, even in the case of terrorist offences.65 The justification of every criminal offence should 
be based on the idea that every offender remains a citizen of the polity.
60	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	pp.	64,	68.
61	 This	means	that	the	criminalization	of	special	preparatory	acts,	like	Art.	421	DPC,	next	to	a	general	preparatory	act,	is	not	problematic	
at	all,	but	should	actually	be	encouraged.	With	Art.	421	DPC,	a	better	demarcation	of	what	constitutes	the	financing	of	terrorism	and	
who	is	an	offender	of	such	an	act	could	be	possible.	But	only	if	the	legislator	is	prepared	to	accept	that	special	preparatory	offences	are	
a specialis	of	general	preparatory	acts	and	should	have	priority	over	general	preparatory	acts.	Unfortunately,	in	the	case	of	Art.	421	DPC,	
the	legislator	refused	to	take	this	step	(Kamerstukken II 2012/13,	33	478,	no.	3,	pp.	10-11).	This	means	that	defining	what	constitutes	the	
financing	of	terrorism	and	who	is	an	offender	and	who	is	not,	is	less	easily	accomplished.
62	 Obligations	can	also	give	a	justification	for	criminalization.	They	can	also	contradict	with	one	another.	The	legislator	has	to	take	these	
issues	into	account	as	well.	See	Ashworth	&	Zedner,	supra	note	48,	p.	291.	
63	 See	on	the	usefulness	of	using	the	notion	of	citizenship	to	consider	issues	of	criminalization	e.g.	P.	Ramsay,	‘The	Responsible	Subject	as	
Citizen.	Criminal	Law,	Democracy	and	the	Welfare	State’,	2006	The Modern Law Review	69,	pp.	29-58;	R.A.	Duff,	Answering for Crime. 
Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law,	2007,	pp.	166-172;	R.A.	Duff,	 ‘Responsibility,	Citizenship	and	Criminal	Law’,	 in	Duff	&	
Green	 (eds.),	 supra	note	48,	pp.	125-148.	See	more	critically	M.D.	Dubber,	 ‘Citizenship	and	Penal	 Law’,	2010	The New Criminal Law 
Review 13, pp. 190-215.
64	 H.R.	van	Gunsteren,	A Theory of Citizenship. Organizing Plurality in Contemporary Democracies, 1998.
65	 The	notion	of	Feindstrafrecht	has	been	debated	in	German	legal	doctrine	over	the	past	decades.	See	Heinrich,	supra	note	9;	A.	Sinn,	
‘Moderne	Verbrechensverfolgung	–	auf	dem	Weg	zu	einem	Feindstrafrecht?’,	2006	Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 1, 
pp.	107-117.	The	term	was	first	used	in	modern	legal	doctrine	by	Jakobs	to	explain	the	increase	in	remote	harms	offences.	See	G.	Jakobs,	
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From a liberal vision of citizenship, the criminalization of remote harms will only be possible in 
very few situations. The liberal citizen is proud of his liberty and always concerned about his liberty. He 
is always looking for political guarantees to prevent government officials threatening his liberty. From 
a liberal point of view, the main goal of criminal law should be to secure the legal position of citizens 
against the state. That means not only limitations on what acts to criminalize, but also how to criminalize 
acts and within what limits. The guarantees the law must give to citizens refer to the security of individual 
autonomy, personal integrity and the legal competence of citizens against whom the criminal justice 
system takes action.66 Individual autonomy refers to individual liability and being able to answer for crimes 
the citizen has committed. This does not mean that offences without a reference to intent or negligence, 
so-called strict-liability offences, are never allowed. As long as courts can take mens rea (which is more 
than just intent or negligence) into account, strict-liability offences are allowed.67 Personal integrity refers 
to the prevention of an all too drastic interference in a citizen’s life, for example by connecting drastic 
penalties to criminal offences. Legal competence means that criminalization should not lead to limiting 
the rights a citizen (as a defendant) has within a criminal procedure.68
In a republican vision of citizenship, citizenship is described as ‘equal and mutually respectful 
participation in the civic enterprise’.69 A citizen is both an author and an addressee of the law. Unlike 
a liberal vision of citizenship, a republican vision also focuses on the responsibilities of citizens toward 
the community. ‘Citizenship ties us (…) to the fellow members of a particular polity: (…) it gives us a 
particular interest, not in every dimension of our fellow’s lives, but in those aspects that bear directly on 
the civic enterprise in which we are collectively engaged.’ Central to the republican vision of criminal law 
is that only ‘public wrongs’ may be criminalized. Public wrongs are ‘wrongs that are the proper business 
of all citizens in virtue of their membership of the polity’s civil life, and the values that structure it.’ As 
in a liberal vision of citizenship, a republican vision leads to a certain restraint on what acts to prohibit. 
Only those acts that are publicly condemned (after a serious democratic debate in which all views have 
been taken into account, see Section 3, above) can constitute a public wrong. This makes clear that harm 
to others in itself is not enough to be considered a public wrong. That harm must generally be accepted 
to be publicly wrong. This more restricted view of what constitutes a public wrong is associated with a 
certain vision of the public sphere and the way citizens should interact with each other. According to 
a republican view, criminal offences should not be the expression of a certain distrust among citizens. 
A republican polity consists of citizens who respect one another. This respect and mutual trust among 
citizens must be expressed in the criminal law. However, this does not mean that the criminal law is not 
to be trusted in principle (as seems to be the starting point from a liberal point of view). According to 
Duff, the criminal law ‘should guide citizens’ conduct only by offering them relevant reasons for action, 
‘Kriminalisierung	 im	 Vorfeld	 einer	 Rechtsgutsverletzung’, 1985 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 97, pp. 751-785. 
Jakobs	 also	 uses	 the	 term	as	 a	 foundation	of	 certain	 parts	 of	 the	 criminal	 law.	 See	G.	 Jakobs,	 ‘Bürgerstrafrecht	 und	 Feindstrafrecht’,	
2004	Onlinezeitschrift für Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum Strafrecht	5,	pp.	88-95.	The	notion	of	‘Feindstrafrecht’	is	translated	as	
‘enemy	criminal	law’	in	English	and	was	used	to	define	the	changes	in	the	criminal	justice	system	after	9/11.	See	e.g.	C.	Gómez-Jara	Díez,	
‘Enemy	Combatants	versus	Enemy	Criminal	Law:	An	Introduction	to	the	European	Debate	Regarding	Enemy	Criminal	Law	and	Its	Relevance	
to	the	Anglo-American	Discussion	on	the	Legal	Status’,	2008	New Criminal Law Review	11,	pp.	529-562;	L.	Zedner,	‘Security,	the	State,	and	
the	Citizen:	The	Changing	Architecture	of	Crime	Control’,	2010	New Criminal Law Review	13,	pp.	379-403.
66	 See	A.A.G.	Peters,	Het rechtskarakter van het strafrecht, 1972, pp. 3, 11.
67	 See	A.P.	Simester,	‘Is	strict	liability	always	wrong?’,	in	A.P.	Simester	(ed.),	Appraising strict liability,	2005,	pp.	21-50;	Ashworth	&	Zedner,	
supra	note	9,	pp.	31-33,	46;	G. v United Kingdom,	[2011]	ECHR	(appl.	no.	37334/08).
68	 See	on	the	relation	between	criminal	law	and	criminal	procedure,	A.	Duff	et	al.,	‘Introduction:	Towards	a	normative	theory	of	the	criminal	
trial’,	in	A.	Duff	et	al.	(eds.),	The trial on trial,	Volume	1,	2004,	pp.	11,	17. We	have	to	realize	that	many	remote	harms	crimes	have	not	only	
been	introduced	to	enable	a	government	to	punish	those	who	commit	these	crimes,	but	have	been	also	introduced	in	order	for	the	police	
and	public	prosecution	service	to	be	able	to	use	investigative	methods	during	the	pre-trial	phase	more	quickly	(See	E.	van	Sliedregt,	Ten to 
one. A contemporary reflection on the presumption of innocence,	2009,	p.	29).	The	more	abstract	and	broadly	described	a	remote	harms	
offence	is,	the	sooner	a	person	can	be	suspected	of	having	committed	such	a	crime,	and	the	sooner	investigative	methods	(including	
arrest	and	even	pre-trial	detention)	can	be	used.	Whether	such	a	case	will	result	 in	a	prosecution	or	even	a	conviction	is	not	always	
important.	This	way	of	using	investigative	methods	(to	prevent	harm	from	occurring)	has	changed	the	relationship	between	substantive	
criminal	law	and	procedural	law	in	favour	of	the	latter,	as	establishing	criminal	liability	and	punishment	is	no	longer	the	only	purpose	of	
criminal	law	,	with	just	preventing	harms	from	occurring	via	the	use	of	investigative	methods	during	the	pre-trial	phase	being	sometimes	
seen	as	enough.	See	on	the	changes	of	the	criminal	trial	in	general	Ashworth	&	Zedner,	supra	note	9,	pp.	22	et	seq.	See	on	policing	and	
crime	prevention	in	a	risk	society,	Kemshall,	supra	note	26,	pp.	103	et	seq.
69	 See	for	this	and	the	following	quotations	R.A.	Duff,	‘A	criminal	law	for	citizens’,	2010	Theoretical Criminology	14,	pp.	300-304.
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grounded in the polity’s good; it should subject them to its coercive actions only when they fail to act in 
accordance with such reasons, and commit a public wrong.’
4.4. Some comments on obligations
Political obligations refer to the notion that the criminal law should be the ultimum remedium.70 This 
could lead to the idea that with the help of the notion of political obligations, the expansion of the 
prohibition of remote harms could be brought to a halt. Criminalizing remote harms can, from a liberal 
point of view, be allowed as long as those offences do not interfere too much with the freedom and 
independence of citizens, or, from a republican point of view, as long as criminalization is not based on 
or does not lead to distrust amongst citizens within the polity. 
When do remote harms offences interfere too much with the freedom and independence of citizens? 
This is especially the case when the offence prohibits ordinary behaviour, without a clear reference to the 
harm that could be caused by that behaviour. From this point of view, concrete endangerment offences 
are not much of a problem, because of the fact that there is a clear relationship between act and harm. 
Abstract-concrete endangerment offences are more problematic, because the description of harm is more 
vague and therefore it is less clear which freedoms are at stake. On the other hand, abstract-concrete 
endangerment offences, like Article 421 DPC, refer to harms and therefore we can at least check what 
freedoms are generally at stake. Abstract endangerment offences are most problematic from a liberal point 
of view, because no clear description of harm is given which could make it impossible to understand 
which freedoms are limited, unless the act itself consists of a ‘public wrong’ (see Section 5.1, below).
From a republican conception of citizenship, remote harms offences are acceptable as long as they 
are not based on or lead to distrust among citizens within the polity. This makes it less easy to distinguish 
between the various forms of endangerment offences. It could be very well possible to use a republican 
concept of citizenship to endorse even abstract endangerment offences,71 as long as this type of offence 
is not based on or leads to distrust among citizens. Simester and von Hirsch seem to embrace a more 
republican vision of citizenship, referring to the responsibilities of citizens within a polity. As we have 
seen, from a republican vision of citizenship, criminalization is possible when an act constitutes a public 
wrong. Without a firm definition of what constitutes a public wrong, the scope of the criminal law is – at 
least in theory – less limited than it would be from a liberal perspective. Criminalization is justified in the 
interest of the polity of which each citizen is a member. As a member of the polity, a citizen has agreed 
to the limitation of one’s freedom, because of the mutual interests of criminalizing certain behaviour. 
A republican vision of citizenship therefore makes a certain disciplining of persons possible. Simester 
and von Hirsch make clear that the value of political obligations in the discussion on criminalization is 
relative; citizenship notions can also be used to criminalize more behaviour instead of less.72
Neither social obligations nor political obligations limit the legislator’s urge to criminalize more and 
more remote harms. This can be explained by the fact that neither social obligations nor political obligations 
have one meaning that could limit the legislator’s possibilities to criminalize remote harms, especially 
abstract endangerment offences. Both types of obligations (also) allow for further criminalization. 
This does not mean that both types of obligations are without utility in the discussion concerning the 
criminalization of remote harms. First, referring to social obligations, the legislator should point out 
more clearly who, exactly, is the addressee of the criminal offence and to which general and special 
(social) obligations the addressee must adhere. Second, claiming that governments all agree on some 
vision of liberal citizenship, the legislator should start pointing out in what way the autonomy, integrity 
and legal competence of citizens are upheld by the criminal offence that is introduced. The legislator 
has to realise that prohibiting remote harms, mainly justified for the sake of ensuring more security for 
citizens (especially against terrorist attacks), in the end could lead to the destruction of the same rights 
(including those that refer to autonomy, integrity and legal competence) that the legislator wants to 
70	 On	the	relevance	of	this	notion	of	criminal	law	as	a	last	resort	in	present-day	criminal	law	see	Husak,	supra	note	19;	Minkkinen,	supra	
note	43;	N.	Jareborg,	‘Criminalization	as	Last	Resort	(Ultima Ratio)’,	2005,	Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law	2,	pp.	521-534.
71	 See	Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	64;	Duff	2007,	supra	note	63,	pp.	171-172;	Ramsay,	supra	note	63,	pp.	39	et	seq.
72	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	68.	See	also	Duff,	supra	note	69,	p.	305.
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protect in the first place.73 This is especially the case with abstract endangerment offences, because the 
seriousness of the limitation of civil freedoms is not immediately clear. The legislator does not seem to be 
aware of this paradox, and even if the legislator is aware of it, the problem is often denied by referring to 
the importance of the criminal intent in a criminal offence that criminalizes remote harms.74 This does 
not solve the problem of over-inclusive criminal offences.75 This is because the legislator seems not to be 
aware that different kinds of endangerment offences partly need different kinds of justifications. If we 
look into the Samir A. case once more, one could argue that criminal intent helps to broaden the scope 
of a criminal offence, instead of limiting it. However, this may be a premature conclusion. We need to 
go into the meaning of intent in remote harms offences and to search for possibilities to limit criminal 
liability.
5. The importance of control
5.1. Normative involvement
What criteria for criminalization should be used depends partly on the type of act that is to be criminalized. 
The acts described in Article 421 DPC only cause harm when others use the money donated by the offender 
to commit terrorist offences. Merely the act of donating money will not necessarily lead to terrorist 
crimes. As we have seen above, the question relating to these types of crimes is whether A can be forced 
not to donate money to another person or organization, because if A does donate money other persons 
could cause harm later on.76 One could claim that the criminalization of A’s behaviour is disproportionate 
because it interferes with A’s autonomy.77 On the other hand, if A shows a form of normative involvement 
in the acts committed by person other than A, one could argue that A’s actions should be criminalized.78 
Classical examples of normative involvement are being an accessory and solicitation. The latter seems 
to be the least problematic of the two, not only as a form of participation but also as an independent 
criminal offence. If A urges B to commit a crime, and B commits the crime as urged by A, it is rather 
obvious that A’s action should be punishable. A has allied herself to the act of B. That means that A’s 
conduct is not only wrongful because of A’s intent (A wants the crime to be committed), but also because 
of A’s action of encouraging B to commit the crime A wants to be committed.79
We can distinguish two kinds of assistance, assistance during the crime (accessory assistance) and 
assistance before the crime (consecutive assistance). It is quite understandable to criminalize assistance 
when the danger of harm becomes more considerable because of the actions of the assistant. If A gives a 
knife to B, knowing that B wants to commit a murder and subsequently kills C with the knife that A gave, 
it is unquestionable whether A is an accessory to the murder of C. If A gives a knife to B, knowing that B 
wants to harm C but B murders C instead, I think it is understandable that A is an assistant to the murder 
of C. The clearer the criminal destination of what is given by A (in the form of opportunity, means or 
intelligence), the more understandable the prohibition of A’s actions is. The less clear the opportunity, 
means or intelligence of A’s actions are, or the less clear the criminal destination is of what A has given to 
B, the more difficult the justification of the criminalization of A’s actions becomes.80 For instance, selling a 
car that becomes involved in a traffic accident does not mean that the car salesman is an accessory to that 
traffic accident. Because a car has a so-called ‘standard legitimate use’,81 the liability of the car salesman is 
out of the question. It is not always obvious when the use of an object is standardly legitimate. Under the 
laws of country A the prohibition of providing a firearm could not be seen as problematic, while under 
73	 Ramsay,	supra	note	11,	p.	228;	M.	Borgers	&	E.	van	Sliedregt,	‘The	Meaning	of	the	Precautionary	Principle	for	the	Assessment	of	Criminal	
Measures	in	the	Fight	Against	Terrorism’,	2009	Erasmus Law Review 2, p. 187.
74	 See	Kamerstukken II 2011/12,	32	842,	no.	5,	p.	5;	Kamerstukken II 2011/12,	32	842,	no.	6,	pp.	2-4.	
75	 See	more	optimistically	on	this	point	Husak,	supra	note	24,	pp.	165	et	seq.
76	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	81.
77	 From	a	republican	model	of	citizenship,	the	criminalization	this	kind	of	behaviour	would	show	too	large	a	distrust	among	citizens	and	
should	therefore	not	be	criminalized.	It	is	not	said	that	in	the	case	A	does	something,	B	will	take	this	further	so	that	C	can	cause	harm	to	
others.	See	Duff,	supra	note	69,	pp.	303-304.
78	 See	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	7,	p.	268;	Duff,	supra	note	69,	p.	304.
79	 See	Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	82.
80	 Husak,	supra	note	24,	p.	164.
81	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	83.
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the laws of country B such a prohibition might interfere with the constitutional right to bear arms.82 
As is more often the case with remote harms offences, societal and political ideas will contribute to the 
question whether the opportunity, means or intelligence A gives to B has a standard legitimate use. The 
uncertainty about the standard legitimate use could also depend on the nature of the opportunity, means 
or intelligence: giving a balaclava to another person would in most cases not be unjustifiable, in other 
cases it would. The question whether this type of conduct should be criminalized can be dependent on 
the question whether the opportunity, means or intelligence is generally used for legitimate purposes. In 
that case, this type of behaviour does not consist of a public wrong, which make prohibition less obvious.83
The decision to criminalize conduct that itself is not immediately unjustifiable could become easier 
when introducing a form of intent in the description of the criminal offence.84 Because most remote harms 
actions are themselves not problematic as such, an intent is needed to make the actions problematic and 
relevant to the criminal law. Intent comes in many forms (from purpose to dolus eventualis),85 and the 
legislator could decide to introduce a stricter form of intent if the act (that is the opportunity, means 
or intelligence) cannot be well defined, or the act is not (really) unjustifiable (meaning: the criminal 
destination of the act is not immediately evident). One could say that the less unjustifiable an act seems 
to be in itself, the more important a role that intent comes to play in a criminal offence (and the less 
obvious it is to accept dolus eventualis or even negligence). The more considerable the chance of harm, 
or the more unjustifiable the act in itself is, the less important the role of intent is in a criminal offence 
(and the more acceptable the use of negligence). According to me, from this it follows that it is not 
problematic to use negligence and dolus eventualis as proof of intent in concrete endangerment offences, 
while in general it should be unacceptable to use negligence and dolus eventualis in the case of abstract 
endangerment offences. In the case of the category of abstract-concrete endangerment offences the use 
of dolus eventualis should depend on whether the harm is more abstractly or more concretely described.
A criminal offence that is too heavily based on intent raises questions which are difficult to answer 
and which could force the courts to make choices which may lead to the exclusion of certain groups 
within society. Too much focus on intent could lead to the criminalization of one’s political, societal or 
religious background, or the orientation of the offender. From both a liberal and republican vision of 
citizenship, this would be unacceptable. It is not clear when the criminal law can be too much focussed on 
intent, the views on this differ, while the question as to whether we can say that too much focus is placed 
on intent will partly depend on what interests are at stake. In this debate we can accept one general rule: 
if the act is mainly justifiable and the chance of harm caused by the defendant’s action is negligible, while 
the effects of criminalization are disproportionate compared to the act, then the criminalization of such 
an act, even if the defendant’s intent (i.e. purpose) is aimed at causing harm, should not be self-evident. 
From this it follows that abstract endangerment offences which prohibit acts that are in themselves not 
unjustifiable, and rely too heavily on intent, are unacceptable.
5.2. Remote harms offences and voluntary abandonment
The importance of intent in remote harms offences leads to the question whether the defendant should 
still be punished if, after the offence was committed, he or she does not want her actions to cause harm 
and tries to prevent harm from occurring. This abandonment of the offence is accepted in both Anglo-
American and civil law criminal justice systems, as long as the abandonment was voluntary.86
Voluntary abandonment can be described as follows: no attempt and no preparation exists when 
the offence has not been completed as a consequence of conditions that are dependent on the offender’s 
will.87 A point of discussion can be whether an offender can voluntarily abandon a general preparatory 
82	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	pp.	84-85;	Husak,	supra	note	24,	pp.	172-173.
83	 Simester	&	von	Hirsch,	supra	note	14,	p.	84.
84	 D.J.	Baker,	‘The	Moral	Limits	of	Criminalizing	Remote	Harms’,	2007	New Criminal Law Review	10,	pp.	370-391.	In	the	following	I	will	focus	
on	intent,	but	the	same	could	be	argued	for	negligence	and	the	necessity	for	the	culpability	of	an	offence	in	general.	See	Husak,	supra	
note	24,	pp.	174	et	seq.
85	 At	least,	in	Dutch	and	German	criminal	law.	See	on	dolus eventualis	e.g.	J.	Blomsma,	Mens rea and defences in European criminal law, 
2012,	pp.	99-134.
86	 Duff,	supra	note	69,	p.	304;	Hoffmann-Holland,	supra	note	23,	pp.	272-294.
87	 See	also	e.g.	Art.	51	Belgian	Penal	Code;	Art.	121-5	French	Penal	Code;	Art.	46b	DPC.	
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act, but not a specific preparatory act (which can be found in the Special Part of the Penal Code).88 
The reason not to accept voluntary abandonment in cases of specific preparatory acts can be argued by 
pointing out that special preparatory acts are in themselves gravely dangerous acts. A danger of harm 
(whether concrete or abstract) was created and one cannot abandon such an act. 
In general, voluntary abandonment in case of (general and special) preparatory acts should not 
make the prohibition of those offences useless. If everyone who commits a preparatory act can claim that 
he voluntarily retreated, no conviction for preparatory acts would be possible. But that does not mean 
that voluntary abandonment should not play a role in the case of preparatory acts at all. Especially in the 
situation where the offender actively neutralises the effects of his preparatory actions, one could argue 
that voluntary abandonment in the case of special preparatory offences is acceptable, especially in the case 
of abstract endangerment offences, because for these offences no great chance of harm is necessary.89 The 
role of voluntary abandonment depends partly on the significance of intent in the preparatory offence. 
The more criminal liability depends on intent, the more useful voluntary abandonment could become 
as a tool for compensating the dependence of criminal liability on intent. This also means, on the other 
hand, that the more grievous the preparatory act in itself is, the less reason there is to accept voluntary 
abandonment. Voluntary abandonment in the case of illegally possessing firearms is hardly thinkable, at 
least from a Dutch perspective.90 But in the case of donating money that is meant to finance terrorism, it 
is imaginable that the donor regrets that he donated money and tries to get his money back. The question 
is then whether the donor can successfully rely on voluntary abandonment and, if so, on what grounds 
his defence can be successful.
One question is whether it is a good use of scarce resources to prosecute defendants for preparatory 
actions if they have abandoned the will to cause harm voluntarily. Subsequently, the question is what penal 
goal prosecution serves in such a situation. Voluntary abandonment has already, so one could argue, had 
a deterrent effect, while the act of abandonment shows that the offender is no longer dangerous. The 
same holds true for retribution. In the case of voluntary abandonment, the offender himself realized his 
mistake and does not want the harm to occur. The fact that he voluntarily abandoned the will to cause 
harm should, in terms of retribution, not lead to further punishment because the lack of will removes the 
foundation of retributive punishment.91 One could argue that it is never clear when or whether someone 
has voluntarily abandoned the will to cause harm, or simply tries to avoid prosecution by claiming he 
abandoned voluntarily.92 This argument does not appeal to me, because why should we be willing to 
prove intent with a certain amount of uncertainty whether the defendant really intended to cause harm, 
but do not accept this uncertainty in the case of voluntary abandonment?
Voluntarily abandoning a crime is thinkable in two cases. First, in cases where the offence was not 
completed (the elements of the offence have not been fulfilled), and second, in cases where the offence was 
completed, but the perpetrator wants to prevent the harm from occurring. In the first category of cases, 
voluntary abandonment does not play a role as a defence. The fact that the offence was not completed 
itself cannot lead to criminal liability (attempt included). Of greater importance is the second category of 
cases. Suppose, again, that someone has donated money to an organization that he knows wants to use 
this to commit terrorist offences. In that case, the donor has fulfilled the elements of Article 421 DPC. 
He can be held accountable for committing the crime described in Article 421 DPC. Suppose, then, that 
this person, after he had donated the money, regrets his act, and tries to retrieve the money, because 
in retrospect he disapproves of terrorist offences. Could this person successfully rely on the defence of 
voluntary abandonment? 
88	 On	this	point	Dutch	law	differs	from	German	criminal	law.	The	Bundesgerichtshof	(the	German	Supreme	Court)	has	decided	that	voluntary	
abandonment	is	possible	in	case	of	the	preparation	of	human	trafficking	(§	234a	German	Penal	Code).	See	J.	Bülte,	‘Der	strafbefreiende	
Rücktritt	 vom	 vollendeten	 Delikt:	 Partielle	 Entwertung	 der	 strafbefreienden	 Selbstanzeige	 gemäß	 §	 371	 AO	 durch	 §	 261	 StGB’,	
2010 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft	122,	p.	571.	The	Dutch	Supreme	Court	has	not	accepted	a	defence	of	voluntary	
abandonment	in	a	case	concerning	a	special	preparatory	act.	See	Hoge	Raad	29	April	1997,	NJ 1997, 667.
89	 Bülte,	supra	note	88,	p.	578;	G.A.M.	Strijards,	Strafbare voorbereidingshandelingen, 1995, p. 62.
90	 See	Strijards,	supra	note	89,	p.	62.
91	 Bülte,	supra	note	88,	pp.	567-570.	From	this	it	follows	that	voluntary	abandonment	must	lead	to	non-punishment,	not	just	to	mitigating	
punishment.
92	 R.A.	Duff,	Criminal Attempts, 1996, p. 67.
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This depends, first of all, on the reasons for abandonment. Abandoning one’s actions under pressure 
from other persons, whether this be state officials or members of his family or friends, cannot lead to 
impunity. Second, accepting voluntary abandonment depends on the type of action. Only an action by 
the defendant that by nature and timing is appropriate to prevent harm from occurring is acceptable as 
voluntary abandonment.93 This means that the abandoning action should undo the dangerousness of 
the defendant’s act. This can only be an act which shows more than a mere change of intent (recognizing 
the error the defendant made). It has to be an act with which the defendant shows he does not want the 
harm to occur. The aim of the abandoning act must be opposed to the result that could be reached by 
the original act.94 Trying to get one’s money back could be seen as voluntary abandonment, depending 
on the way and with what intent one wants to retrieve one’s money. I doubt if there would be voluntary 
abandonment if a person wants his money back only because he has found a better reason for using it. 
That does not provide sufficient proof of opposing the result that could be reached by the original act.
6. Concluding remarks
At present, it is unrealistic to think that remote harms offences should not be a part of the criminal law. 
These offences form as much a part of the criminal law as harmful offences. What is needed is a clear 
framework under which remote harms may be criminalized. This contribution constitutes an attempt to 
refine existing frameworks. 
First, on the basis of the so-called standard harm analysis, remote harms may be criminalized. 
However, we have seen that the standard harm analysis alone does not suffice. Especially in cases 
where no considerable chance of harm exists, the so-called abstract-concrete or abstract endangerment 
offences, the standard harm analysis does not provide enough solid arguments to prohibit these types 
of offences. We have seen that the so-called de minimis principle also does not provide a satisfactory 
answer, because this principle does not make a difference among the various endangerment offences. 
More promising seems to be the principle of fair imputation. Regarding this principle, we saw that with 
regard to the criminalization of remote harm offences, attention should be paid to so-called obligations, 
which can be divided into social and political obligations. The former can distinguish persons who 
should and who should not be held criminally liable and can therefore help to restrict the offence. The 
latter refer to requirements of citizenship. Both forms of obligations do not prevent the criminalization of 
remote harms (and could still lead to over-inclusive criminalization) but make clear that a more detailed 
justification as to why the criminalization of these types of offences is in some cases necessary. From a 
republican point of view, abstract-concrete endangerment offences can be justified. The justification of 
abstract endangerment offences is, from both a liberal and a republican point of view, problematic. From 
this it follows that a legislator should opt for an abstract-concrete endangerment offence, as much as 
possible, instead of an abstract endangerment offence. Finally, the legislator should make more clear the 
meaning of intent in remote harms offences. There is a great deal of uncertainty concerning the meaning 
and significance of intent in remote harms offences among scientists and in legal practice alike. The 
legislator should not make the mistake of presuming that introducing intent in remote harms offences 
make these offences clearer. Using intent without making clear why the action itself is unjustifiable does 
not help to make a clear distinction between criminal and non-criminal action. A circular argument 
seems to appear in cases where intent plays a major role in defining the scope of a criminal offence: the 
act itself is hardly unjustified, but this is compensated by the intent of the offender, this intent is based on 
the offender’s behaviour, but as we saw this behaviour was hardly unjustified. What will decide why the 
offender’s act was punishable could then be based on the religious, political or societal background of the 
offender. That is unacceptable in a democratic constitutional state, for we do not punish people for who 
they are, but for what they do. According to me, this means that abstract endangerment offences that rely 
too heavily on intent remain problematic both from a liberal and a republican view and should not be 
prohibited, unless the act itself constitutes a public wrong. Voluntary abandonment could in a way help to 
93	 Compare	Hoge	Raad	13	March	2007,	NJ 2007,	171;	Hoge	Raad	3	March	2009,	NJ 2009, 236.
94	 E.	Sikkema,	Voorbereidingshandelingen, 2012, p. 60.
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prevent the courts from basing criminal liability on other elements than unjustifiable behaviour, but this 
can only be useful in exceptional circumstances, not as a tool to repair criminal offences that do not make 
clear what acts constitute a public wrong and what acts do not. In the end it is up to the legislator not to 
criminalize abstract endangerment offences too easily, taking both a liberal and republican conception 
of citizenship into account. ¶
